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Abstract 
Even after 10 years, countries under transition are still on their way to becoming developed, 
internationally competitive countries. At this stage it is helpful for business cooperation to 
know whether managers in countries undergoing transition are behaving like socialists or 
Western managers, or somewhere in between. Many joint ventures and other alliances 
between Western companies and companies in countries in transition are seeking to 
establish new markets with new products or new technologies (i.e., new processes). They are 
risky because the returns are uncertain. Understanding the risk attitudes of managers in 
countries in transition can explain different investment behavior and provide vital 
information for installing the right incentives. This study compares the risk attitudes of 
Chinese, eastern, and western German managers. Chinese managers' risk attitudes seem to 
be more similar to the attitudes of western German managers than to those of their 
counterparts in eastern Germany. Some of the reasons and consequences are discussed in 
this article. 
 
1 
 
 
Introduction 
Even after 10 years of transition there seems to be many differences in management behavior 
between countries under transition and Western countries. This study examines the risk-taking 
behavior of Chinese, eastern, and western German managers. 
    From the management point of view, transition means making the company competitive for 
global or international markets. To turn companies into competitive organizations, managers in 
countries under transition have to invest into product or process innovations (among others). 
Obviously these investments are risky. Whether managers in countries under transition take the 
risk or not is determined by their risk behavior. The focus of this article is whether the risk 
behavior in China and in eastern Germany as regions under transition differ, or are different to 
western Germany as an example of a developed Western economy. 
    Knowing that differences in risk-taking behavior exist is crucial, especially for cooperation 
projects in countries where Eastern and Western managers with their different backgrounds are 
working together. It helps to evaluate and understand the decisions of the cooperation partner 
which may, under certain circumstances, have a totally different basis. Thus, knowing the risk 
attitudes of people to cooperate with is very helpful for understanding different project 
evaluations. For Western managers cooperating with eastern German or Chinese managers this 
article will serve as a basis for understanding different risk attitudes and behavior in these 
economic regions and therefore understanding investment decisions involving product and 
process innovations. 
 
 
Innovation, Risk and Return 
Especially in countries under transition, product and process innovations are key factors for 
economic development. A frequently used definition of innovation by Knight reads: 
"Innovation is adoption of a change which is new to an organization and to its relevant 
environment" (Knight, 1967, p. 478). Innovations can be classified according to many criteria. 
A common classification is product, process, and social. 
    Product innovation refers to either a new product or the improvement of an existing one. 
Often companies consider a product as an innovation which they had not previously produced, 
even if this product had already been marketed by other companies. In our article we will use 
this definition. With the term process innovation we mean either a new or an improved 
manufacturing process in which the application of new knowledge results in increased 
productivity or quality in the production process. 
    Social innovations involve either changes in norms or changes in the forms of interaction 
between individuals or groups of individuals (Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971). If innovation is one 
side of the coin, risk is the other. There is no investment into an innovation or into change 
without risk. The concept of risk has been defined in different ways in literature. We will follow 
Knight's definition which distinguishes between risk and uncertainty (Knight, 1967). Risk is 
defined by a decision situation where an a priori probability or where a posteriori statistical 
probability exists, and uncertainty is a decision situation without any probabilities. 
    On the other hand innovations are accompanied by an expected return which can compensate 
the risk of the decision maker. So it is seif-evident that investments in innovations are made 
because of the expected returns, but both risk and return determine the decision situation. A 
positive correlation between profit expectation and risk-taking attitude is assumed in the 
portfolio-selection theory (Markowitz, 1959) and similar in the risk-analysis model of Herz 
(Herz, 1969). 
    However, the hypothesis of a positive correlation between profit expectation and risk-taking 
behavior in investment or innovation decisions (i.e. a positive correlation between risk and 
return) is not undisputed. Bowman, for example, found that highly profitable American 
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companies showed a lower willingness to take risk than less-profitable ones (Bowman, 1982, 
p. 33). Bowman's findings for US managers were confirmed for (west) German managers by 
Perlitz and Löbler (1995). In the early 1980s it seemed paradox that risk and return were not 
positively correlated as it was written in all textbooks. So Bowman called it a risk/return 
paradox. Further investigations of this phenomenon showed that decision theory had to be 
rewritten with respect to this. A new approach in decision theory called prospect theory now 
explains this paradox as follows: If a return is negative from the decision maker's point of view, 
he or she behaves like a risk seeker. If the return is positive from his or her point of view, he or 
she avoids risk. The positive correlation holds only in the positive return Gase. But the prospect 
theory is only based on empirical results of Western managers in market economies. Socialist 
managers had not yet been included. We do not know whether managers from former socialist 
countries have the same risk attitudes as their Western counterparts, even after 10 years of 
transition. This article provides a step toward closing this gap. 
    Many empirical studies have analyzed risk/return patterns. Figure 1 distinguishes those 
studies which focus an analyzing the risk/return pattern on the corporate level from those which 
focus mainly an an individual level. The consequences of the results of these studies are 
discussed broadly in Perlitz & Löbler (1995). What are the risks (chances) involved in 
innovations? 
    To get information about chances of success of product and process innovations, it is helpful 
to look at the results of empirical surveys. An empirical study of innovations with 700 producers 
of consumer and capital goods conducted by Booz, Allen, and Hamilton (1982) has shown that 
only 25 percent of the product innovations succeeded on the market. In contrast process 
innovations seem to be more successful. Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1993) investigated 103 
innovations in the chemical industry in North America and Europe: 69.2 percent of the 52 
process innovations turned out to be successful. An investigation of innovations in mechanical 
engineering industry conducted by Schewe supports the results for process innovations. Only 
28 percent of the 39 process innovations failed (Schewe, 1992, pp. 967). 
    Roughly speaking, the probability of success of a product innovation is 25 percent, and of a 
process innovation it is 75 percent. In addition we know that the distinction between positive 
and negative returns is important for judging the risk attitude. We used these probabilities to 
design the following decision alternatives. 
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Decisions Alternatives 
We offered four decisions with two alternatives each to managers of the previously mentioned 
countries who were responsible for investment decisions in their companies. In the first 
situation the company is in a profit situation. We call this situation the opportunity case. In the 
second situation the company is in a loss situation. We call this situation the crisis case. 
    These two situations (opportunity and crisis) and the two types of innovation (product and 
process) result in four decisions for the managers to make. Each decision has two alternatives: 
a risky and a nonrisky one (see Table 1 and Table 2). 
    In the opportunity case, the secure alternative is reflected by a return an investment (ROI) of 
10 percent with a probability of P = 1. Sometimes a continue-as-now decision seems to be a 
riskless alternative in a profitable situation; therefore, we call this alternative a continue-as-now 
decision or a secure investment. For the uncertain alternative of decision 1 (process innovation), 
we assume a 75 percent probability of a 15 percent ROI with a remaining 25 percent probability 
of a 0 percent ROI. The expected return is therefore 11.25 percent. In decision 2, the product 
innovation is reflected by a 25 percent probability of a 45 percent ROI with a remaining 75 
percent probability of a 0 percent ROI, which also results in an expected return of 11.25 percent. 
As already mentioned, process innovations are typically characterized by potential for improved 
returns and limited risk. Thus, the uncertain alternative in decision 1 corresponds to a process 
innovation, whereas the uncertain alternative in decision 2 corresponds to a product innovation. 
 
 
 
 
        
    In the crisis situation, we assume a certain loss of 10 percent which could in real life result 
from a continue-as-now decision which seems riskless but not very helpful for the company. 
The ferst uncertain alternative set against the certain loss (decision 3) is characterized by a high 
probability (P = 0.75) that the company can achieve breakeven (i.e. ROI = 0 percent) which 
would lead out of the loss situation. However, there is a 25 percent probability that the company 
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will come out with a ROI of -45 percent. This decision corresponds to a process innovation 
which can lead to rationalization within the company. But if the rationalization within the 
company is not successful, the company will lose its competitiveness and this will lead to the 
high losses assumed here. The expected return of this innovation alternative is -11 .25 percent. 
The second uncertain decision in a crisis situation (decision 4) is characterized by a 75 percent 
probability of suffering a negative ROI of 15 percent with a remaining 25 percent probability 
that the company will reach the break-even point (ROI = 0). Given the 25 percent probability 
that the company will come out of the crisis, this uncertain alternative corresponds to a product  
innovation, and its expected return is also - 11.25 percent. 
 
 
The Sample 
These four decisions with two alternatives each were presented to 230 managers from western 
Germany, 187 managers from eastern Germany, and 51 managers from China. All worked in 
large companies (>200 employees) and all were responsible for investment decisions. Table 3 
shows the age distribution of the three groups of managers in percent. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Results 
Table 4 shows the results for the process innovations. While 60.9 percent of the western German 
managers in the opportunity situation prefer the certain alternative (continue-as-now or secure 
investment), 51 percent of the Chinese managers and 57.8 percent of the eastern German 
managers prefer the process innovation in this situation. Thus, western German managers tend 
to be risk averse in the opportunity situation. In contrast the majority of eastern German 
managers and Chinese managers choose the risk in the opportunity situation. This means that 
they are less risk averse compared to their counterparts of western Germany. 
    The crisis case has shown that 85.1 percent of the Western managers opted for the more risky 
process innovation over the continueas-now alternative, even though the expected return (-
11.25 percent) of a process innovation is lower than the continue-as-now 
alternative (-10 percent). That is also the case for Chinese managers, where 70.8 percent 
preferred the process innovation; and for the eastern German managers, where 58.3 percent 
decided in favor of the process innovation. That means that in a crisis situation, a process 
innovation is chosen considerably more often than in an opportunity situation. Western German 
managers who are risk averse in an opportunity situation become risk takers in a crisis situation. 
While nearly half of the Chinese managers are risk averse in an opportunity situation, most of 
them also -become risk takers in a crisis situation. In contrast, eastern German managers are 
less risk averse in an opportunity and less risk seeking in a crisis situation. 
    Table 5 compares the certain alternative of an investment or the continue-as-now scenario 
with a product innovation. It shows that in an opportunity situation the certain investment or 
continue-as-now scenario is preferred to the uncertain product innovation by 80.7 percent of 
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the western German managers, 74.8 percent of the eastern German managers, and 58 .8 percent 
of the Chinese managers. The managers chose the certain alternative (10 percent), although the 
expected value of return is lower than that of the uncertain alternative (11.25 percent). 
    In a crisis situation, however, the continue-as-now scenario is chosen by 28.7 percent of the 
western German, 67.9 percent of the eastern German, and 43.8 percent of the Chinese managers, 
whereas the alternative of product innovation is selected by 71.3 percent of the western German, 
32.1 percent of the eastern German, and 56.3 percent of the Chinese managers. In the 
opportunity situation, the majority of all managers prefer the certain alternative. In the crisis 
situation only the eastern German managers prefer the certain alternative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Table 6 gives an overview of the preferences for the western, eastern German, and Chinese 
managers in terms of secure investment, process, and product innovation. As Table 6 shows, 
the risk preferences are the same for eastern German and Chinese managers in the opportunity 
situation. In the crisis situation, however, the preferences of the Chinese managers are similar 
to the risk preferences of the western German managers. What can be said about the risk attitude 
of the managers in general? Of course the no risk alternative is less risky than the risky 
alternatives (product and process Innovation). The risk of the risky alternatives, which have all 
the same expected return, can be assessed according to the criterion of Rothschild and Stiglitz 
(Sarin & Weber, 1993, p. 140). Following this criterion, a lottery (random variable) Y is more 
risky than X, if their cumulative distribution function G and F fulfill the following inequality: 
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    Using this criterion and the managers decision results, one can determine the risk attitudes 
shown in Table 7. As Table 7 shows, managers from western Germany and eastern Germany, 
although living in the same economic system since 1990, have significant differences in their 
risk taking behavior in both situations. Managers from China and West Germany, however, 
behave quite similar in the crisis case, despite their cultural distance. Surprisingly, most of the 
Chinese managers, like their western German counterparts, show risk-seeking behavior in the 
crisis situation. In this situation, Chinese managers are more similar in their risk-taking behavior 
to the western German than to the eastern German managers. In an opportunity situation the 
Chinese managers, like the eastern German managers, are taking more risks than the western 
German managers. In total, eastern German managers are least risk sensitive while western 
German managers are the most risk sensitive decision makers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The common economic and political background of the eastern German managers and their 
Chinese counterparts could serve as an explanation for their similar risk-taking behavior in the 
opportunity situation. Even today, the decision-makers in eastern Germany and China have 
spent a considerable part of their training and working life in a socialist economy and in a 
totalitarian political system. 
    Under the past system, central planning was the basic mechanism of coordinating the 
economic actors. Plan fulfillment was the measure of a manager's success. The planning 
prescribed the quantitative, nonfinancial targets, like output of a steel mill measured in tons. 
Managers had little or no influence on the goal-setting process. 
    This central planning inhibited the innovative behavior because the plans were based on 
items which did exist, not on items which still needed to be created. Even the R&D budget was 
planned for the whole economy by a central department. The managers could neither apply for 
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an R&D budget nor did they necessarily get one. Therefore, the managers had no opportunity 
to make risky decisions on the organizational level. 
    In additioon to creating these limitations in the organizational context, the high degree of 
socialist political order in these regions also reduced the need for risky decisions in every day 
life. Life tended to be predetermined, with limited individual freedom in making decisions on, 
for example, the field of training or study, employment, residence, goods consumed, savings, 
and social security. Neither at work nor in their private lives were managers able to develop a 
sensitivity to risk. 
    One might argue that today the differentes in the economic and political systems between 
East and West are virtually nonexistent in the Gase of Germany and shrinking rapidly with 
respect to China. Nevertheless, the finite speed of learning justifies the assumption that today's 
managers are still formed by what they experienced in the past, and in this Gase the sensitivity 
to risk is still not fully developed.  
    While the Chinese managers behave more similarly to the eastern German managers in the 
opportunity situation, they behave more similarly to the western German managers in the crisis 
situation. Therefore, the risk sensitivity of Chinese managers lies between the risk sensitivity 
of eastern and western Germans. A simple, yet evident, explanation for this finding could be 
that the Chinese managers have had more opportunities than the eastern Germans to learn 
decision making in crisis situations. 
    Evident differentes between the transition policies of eastern Germany and China are the 
speed with which market principles have been implemented, and the ownership of policies 
relating to the transition process. China has followed an approach of slow transformation and 
incremental changes over a longer period of time. Chinese administration and management 
consciously determined the speed and direction of the national transition process, with the role 
of foreigners being of limited importance. The transformation has been regarded as an 
opportunity by a large percentage of the population and particularly by managers who haue 
seen their decision-making power and income perspectives grow. Managers see themselves as 
constructing a modern economy, and this positive thinking might increase their propensity to 
take risks in business. 
    Instead of initiating and maintaining change an its own, muck of the eastern German 
population felt itself subject to a radical transformation which was brought about by an 
administration and management dominated by western Germans. Changes came quickly and 
from the outside. Privatization in most cases either meant a financial take-over by a western 
German company or liquidation after the evaluation of the firm's financial health by western 
German experts. Layoffs were common, and unemployment rose to unexpected levels. This 
sense of a lack of decision-making power may haue had a paralyzing effect and thus have 
reduced the sensitivity to take risks. 
    While the Chinese may Kave developed a sensitivity for the opportunities of crisis situations 
through the autonomy of directing their own development, the eastern Germans have had no 
opportunity to do this. This could offer an explanation for the Chinese managers behaving more 
similarly to the western Germans in the crisis situation. 
    The history of the economic and political systems and the different transition paths seem to 
affect the risk sensitivity of managers in eastern Germany and China. Taking into account the 
finite speed of individual learning, risk-taking behavior may indeed lag behind the structural 
changes. Although we have not directly investigated how much each of there factors influences 
risk sensitivity, we believe that they could provide a good framework for explaining the 
outcome of our study. Nevertheless, there arises a demand for future research on this subject. 
Studies of other countries in transition, like Estonia and Poland, that have changed 
independently like China, but quickly like eastern Germany, would certainly offer an interesting 
enhancement to our findings as well. 
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    In conclusion, the chosen line of reasoning in our study suggests that a few items could 
promote risk sensitivity as an important element of innovation for systems under transition. 
    Decentralization of decision power to the manager will enhance the self-responsibility and 
involvement in the innovation process. Incentives should accompany the decentralization and 
expose the managers to the risk of decision-making that is connected with innovation. 
    With respect to the more flexible and overt nature of young people, human resource strategies 
in companies should be rethought. For example, young managers should be promoted based on 
competence instead of seniority as they have spent less of their life in a pretransitional society. 
These aspects could help a company or cooperation project to manage a quick transformation 
into a capitalistoriented organization. 
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